For what could justify such interference? Surely not any sense of scandal or offense [das Skandal] , perhaps, which a state arouses in the subjects of another state. It should rather serve as a warning to others, as an example of the great evils into which a people has incurred by its lawlessness. And a bad example which one free person gives to another (as a scandalum acceptum) is not the same as an injury to the latter. But it would be a different matter if a state, through internal discord, were to split into two parts, each of which set itself up as a separate state and claimed authority over the whole. For it could not be reckoned as interference in another state's constitution is an external state were to lend support to one of them because their condition is one of anarchy. But as long as the internal conflict is not yet decided come to this critical point, the interference of external powers would be a violation infringe of the rights of an independent people which is merely struggling with its internal ills. Such interference would be an active offense [ein gegebenes Skandal] and would make the autonomy of all other states insecure» 2 .
In Kant's original text the German word Skandal occurs twice: das Skandal, ein gegebenes Skandal (a given scandal). He uses as well the Latin expression scandalum acceptum (scandal taken or received), whose meaning deserves to be explained.
Nisbet seems to feel the necessity to reinforce the first occurrence of Skandal by adding «or offense» and to conceal the second one -the «scandal taken» -, by rendering it as «an active offense» 3 . Kant, however, employs the pair scan- linked, on the active side, to a direct scandal; it is just acceptum if the act from which the sinner has taken inspiration has been done without the intention to give others a bad example. In the latter case, the responsibility of the sin lies only on the shoulders of the sinner: he has no one but himself to blame, because no one had the intention to lead him into sin. The scandalizing act, indeed, might be objectively or subjectively good as well: it is just an accidental cause of a sin originating only from the interpretation and the choice of the scandalized. Johnston is aware of the theological meaning of the word scandalum, but he misses the connection of the scandalum acceptum with the passive side of the sin of scandal. The question, on the passive side, is not how accurately we are judging an action, but what we are going to do after having seen it. On the active side of a scandalum acceptum there is no given scandal just because there is no intention to set a bad example by one's own behaviour, however bad, good or indifferent it might be. In legal terms: as the scope of a constitution, however bad it might be, does not spread beyond the border of its state, the countries imitating it are the only responsible for their choice.
In 2010 Jonathan Bennett published his translation 11 of the Perpetual
Peace within the project Early Modern Texts. His note about the fifth preliminary article is as follows:
«In the rest of this paragraph, 'scandal' (German Skandal) is being used in something like its theological sense (quoting the Shorter Oxford) of 'moral perplexity caused by the conduct of a person looked up to as an example' . The Latin scandalum acceptum is a technical term from Thomist theology. You might think that state x is authorized to interfere with state y if y's subjects behave in ways that create a scandal for x's subjects. But that's not right. A better response to that kind of thing is to exhibit y not as a temptation but as a warning of what can happen if a state lets its people behave lawlessly. In such a scandalum acceptum -i.e. letting that behaviour happen rather than stepping in and putting a stop to it·-the leaders of x are perhaps setting a bad example to others, but they aren't doing harm» 12 .
Bennett seems to be aware of the theological meaning of scandalum. Aquinas, indeed, draws a distinction between active and passive scandals; he admits, as well, the possibility of a passive scandal that is not connected with an active scandal:
«Another's words or deed may be the cause of another's sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. On this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called "active scandal". Aquinas' distinction between active and passive scandal mirrors the distinction between scandala data and accepta of the Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie.
On the one hand, just like in Aquinas' active scandals, in the scandala data there is a necessary connection between the sin of the scandalizer and the sin of the scandalized; on the other hand, such a connection is only accidental or contingent both in Aquinas' passive scandals and in Kant's scandala accepta.
Bennett, then, is right in tracing the root of Kant's expression in Thomist theology. He misunderstands, however, the technicality of the scandalum acceptum, which is, in the language of the Summa, just a passive scandal without an active side, and not the acquiescence to a sinful behaviour.
A seeming exception to the non-interventionism rule: civil war
While innovating the matter of the modern international law, the preliminary articles are still preserving its form. In fact, they do not jeopardize the principle of state sovereignty 14 and the international law consensual nature. clear that there is no civil constitution any longer. Therefore, an armed interference of another country is simply an intervention in a state of nature. The expedient of war -both among states and within collapsed states -is always the mark of the state of nature: its very use denotes the lack of a system of justice.
In conclusion: the scrutiny of the fifth and sixth preliminary articles of the Perpetual Peace yields two results.
1.
Justifying an armed intervention as a way to improve the allegedly bad constitution of the enemy does not help to abolish war as a means of settling international controversies: it makes it more likely.
2. A peace-enforcing or a peace-keeping intervention in a civil war is just a war like the others: not better, not worse. 
